Introduction
The 2007-9 Great Recession reached its culmination point in 15 September 2008 with the demise of Lehman Brothers and the near collapse of the global financial system. A major banking crash would follow as a result of impending stock markets mayhem and abnormal credit risk contagion (Bartram and Bodnar, 2009; Longstaff, 2010) . UK banking institutions in particular were severely affected by this turn of events. The oligopolistic structure of the industry and the weight of financial services in the UK economy did not facilitate recovery ex-post. Although losses incurred were somewhat unpredictable, the crisis itself did not come as a surprise. Early signs for a global downturn looming could be spotted in standard economic indicators as early as summer/fall 2006 (Mihm, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) . Financial markets' indicators would follow suit soon after with mild and sporadic warnings from index options. 1 In this contribution we examine whether similar warning signals could be patterned in equity options markets (for options on individual stocks) in the UK. Specifically, we analyze the information efficiency of option IV as a predictor of (future) realized stocks downside volatility -a proxy for bank soundness and downside risk -of the four major UK banks around the 2008 global markets crash. 2 Given that the event was mainly banking-driven, it is interesting to shed light on the interaction between banks' stock prices and the volatilities implied by transactions prices for their exchange-listed options during the time leading to the crash. Prior research has already established that variances induced from banking equity options prices are better (but biased) forecasts of bank stock volatility, and hence bank failure probability, than traditional frameworks used in the financial services sector to monitor banking turbulence (for example, Swidler and Wilcox, 2002) . However, this evidence is specific to US banks and, though comprehensive time wise, did not cover banking-specific crises at the time.
In this study we examine related IV dynamics for UK high street banks in the particular context of the fall 2008 banking crash. We follow the behavior of banking options IVs from 2006 to 2008 and analyze predictive power and information content vis-à-vis the subsequent behavior of the underlying banks' stock prices. We emphasize the case of UK banks because of their heavy weight in the global financial system, their significant role in the recent subprime financial crisis, the relative liquidity of equity options written on UK banking stocks, and the need for further (derivatives) marketsbased research on banking risk and soundness (see for example Ioannidis et al., 2010; Liadaki and Gaganis, 2010; Trutwein and Schiereck, 2011) .
Several studies have attempted to examine the information content of option implied volatility around crisis phenomena or highly uncertain events (for example, Bates, 1991; Gemmill, 1992; Poteshman, 2006) . Such works would mainly revolve around the trading dynamics of index and foreign exchange options (for example, Bhabra et al., 2001; Cao et al., 2005; Dupoyet, 2006) . Research on equity options and their implied volatility, however, is relatively scarce (Taylor et al., 2010; Elkamhi and Ornthanalai, 2010; Xing et al., 2010) . Regarding the 2007-9 Great Recession, contributions on the forecasting ability of options markets are probably still emerging, but are usually not on banking downside risk (Figlewski, 2009; Birru and Figlewski, 2009; Cao et al., 2011; Trutwein and Schiereck, 2011) . Here, we are concerned with the predictive power of IV as a forecast for bank stock downside volatility realized during the peak of the 2007-9 financial crisis. If we can obtain information from options markets regarding expected/future downturns, proactive -rather than reactive -and coordinated measures can be adopted by senior bankers and regulators to prevent systemic banking failure, and protect the real economy against severe economic shocks. IV inputs from options markets can be employed in conjunction with, and as inputs to, other warning and risk management systems (for example, ratings, yield spreads, value-at-risk, credit default swap (CDS) spreads and so on) to gauge banking distress in advance and signal markets downturn well ahead of backward looking financial and economic metrics (see for example Hamalainen et al., 2012 and the case of Northern Rock).
Options prices data over 2006-8 for four of the five largest UK banks at the time, Barclays, RBS, HSBC and Lloyds TSB, are analyzed to examine possible evidence of aggregate market opinion prior to September/October 2008 of an imminent banking downfall. The relationship between banks' stock downside volatility and IV from a set of OTM put options written on individual banking stocks is investigated under the elementary Black-Scholes (1973) and Merton (1976) jump diffusion, hereafter BS and MJD respectively, IV frameworks. OLS and 2SLS regressions are conducted using several prediction windows to test, with daily but Newey-West adjusted overlapping data, if and to what extent implied volatility could be a (un)biased predictor of banking (future) volatility and downside risk realized during
